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THE ROLE OF FORGONE OPPORTUNITIES IN DECISION 
MAKING UNDER RISK 
 
 
We present an economic experiment designed to study the role of forgone opportunities in decision 
making under risk. By facing individuals with a dynamic environment in which their decisions, 
together with chance, determine their future options, we show that previously faced opportunities 
influence subsequence choices in predictable ways. Having faced worse options in the past increases 
significantly individuals’ risk aversion and having faced better options reduces it. These patterns are 
fundamentally at odds with most existing decision theories, including Expected Utility Theory and 
standard versions of Prospect Theory, the dominant models in economics. Two alternative theoretical 
accounts are discussed.        
 
 
It seems apparent on an intuitive level that the opportunities we forgo affect our evaluation of 
the options currently available to us. A good example of this is that individuals constantly 
evaluate their outcomes relative to “what might have been”. Some prominent cases of this 
kind of behaviour can be found in the psychological literature on counterfactual thinking. For 
instance, Medvec et al. (1995) showed that silver medallists are generally less happy with 
their results than bronze medallists. Silver medallists seem to feel closer to the opportunity of 
getting gold and compare their outcome with it. On the other hand, bronze medallists feel 
closer to the option of finishing without a medal and compare their achievement with it. 
These counterfactuals do not affect at all the actual outcomes of the athletes, but they 
determine how they are evaluated.  
Along the same lines, Kahneman and Tversky (1982) faced people with the hypothetical 
situations of two travellers that missed their flights due to a traffic jam. One of them missed 
the flight by 30 minutes and the other only by 5 minutes, because his flight had been delayed 
for 25 minutes. The authors show that people evaluate significantly more negatively the 
second situation than the first one. Although the actual outcome to be evaluated is the same in 
both situations (the travellers missed their flights), the opportunity of having arrived on time 
seems closer in the second case and, consequently, it leads to a stronger positive 
counterfactual that affects negatively the evaluation of the actual outcome. Other interesting 
illustrations of the effects of counterfactual thinking can be found, for example, in Johnson 
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(1986), Kahneman and Miller (1986), Medvec and Savitsky (1997), Roese (1999) or Epstude 
and Roese (2008) (see Roese and Olson, 1995, for a review). 
Despite these ideas, virtually all existing decision theories assume that the evaluation of 
the options available to the decision maker is completely independent of previously faced 
opportunities (unless those opportunities actually affect the decision maker’s asset position). 
This is certainly an assumption of Expected Utility Theory, EUT, (von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, 1947) and of standard versions of Prospect Theory, PT, (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), the dominant decision models in economics. 
Other prominent theories that operate under this assumption include, for example, Rank-
Dependent Utility Theory (Quiggin, 1982), Regret Theory (Bell, 1982; Loomes and Sugden, 
1982), the Transfer of Attention Exchange (TAX) model (see Birnbaum, 2008), Decision 
Field Theory (Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993) or static choice heuristics (see, for example, 
Brandsttater et al., 2006).    
In this paper, we present an economic experiment designed to study the role of forgone 
opportunities in decision making under risk. We face participants with a computerized 
dynamic decision environment in which their current choices between risky monetary 
alternatives, together with chance, determine their future options. Thereby, we show that 
previously faced opportunities affect subsequent economic decisions in predictable ways. 
Namely, having faced worse options in the past significantly increases individuals’ degree of 
risk aversion and having faced better options reduces it. These findings have wide-ranging 
implications for economic theory and important potential applications. 
We propose two alternative theoretical approaches to accommodate the role of 
previously faced opportunities in decision making. The first one involves adopting a 
reference-dependent approach in which the reference point is determined by expectations 
influenced by previously faced options, along the lines of the models recently proposed by 
Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007, 2009). This approach also links our findings with a recent 
paper by Post et al. (2008) in which a data set from the “Deal or no Deal” TV game show is 
used to demonstrate that decision making in the game seems to be path-dependent (that is, 
affected by previous choice situations). The authors propose a reference-dependent model 
with a slow-adjusting reference point to account for their findings. As will be explained in 
Section 1, our experimental design shares some important similarities with the Deal or no 
Deal game environment. 
The second theoretical account we propose can be parsimoniously derived from Stewart 
et al.’s (2006) Decision by Sampling (DbS) model. DbS is a sequential-sampling decision 
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theory, according to which the value assigned to choice options depends on the relative rank 
that their attributes occupy within relevant comparison samples taken from the current choice 
environment and from memory. In such a framework, previously faced options systematically 
affect subsequent decisions and our findings can be straightforwardly explained.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, our experimental design is 
explained; in Section 2, the results are presented; in Section 3, our proposed theoretical 
accounts are discussed; Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
1. Experimental Design 
 
The main goal of our experimental design is to construct a controlled economic decision 
environment that is both dynamic and risky, in which the choices that individuals make, 
together with chance, determine the options available to them in the future. That environment 
will then be used to produce transparent tests of the influence of previously faced 
opportunities on economic decision making.   
With that goal in mind, we created an individual computerized game, which revolves 
around two different types of assets; one type pays €100 and the other €0.1
 
 Five assets of 
each type are involved in the game (10 overall). The different assets are represented by 
transparent numbered boxes displayed on the screen in two separate columns, labelled as 
good boxes, containing €100, and bad boxes, containing €0 (see screenshot from the game in 
Figure 1). The game consists of a series of rounds, in which subjects have to choose between 
a sure amount of money offered to them and progressing to the next round. Each time the 
subject chooses to progress to the next round, one of the remaining assets is automatically 
lost (that is, removed from the game by the computer) and the next offer is made. If 
participants reject all the sure amounts of money offered to them throughout the game, they 
end up getting the final remaining asset as a payoff. Thus, the game consists of a maximum 
of nine decisions between a sure sum of money and progressing to the next scenario. At the 
end of the game, subjects were actually paid their corresponding prizes.   
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
                                                 
1  The experiment was programmed using Z-Tree, originally developed by Urs Fischbacher (2007) at the 
University of Zürich. 
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The sure amounts of money offered to the participants follow always a fixed rule, which 
is the 80% of the average value (AV) of the remaining assets. This rule, together with the rest 
of the game, was thoroughly explained at the beginning of the experimental sessions, and the 
AV and the 80% of the AV of the outstanding boxes were always clearly displayed on the 
screen.2
In essence, we have a dynamic decision environment in which subjects face 
opportunities, in the form of sums of money, and those opportunities change as a function of 
subjects’ choices and chance.  
 Moreover, the percentages of remaining good and bad boxes were at all times shown 
on the screen too. After each decision, participants received additional information on the 
amounts rejected and the boxes lost thus far. 
Finally, to attain a clear picture of the role of forgone opportunities in decision making, 
we need to generate transparent comparison points in which participants reach exactly the 
same decisions but having faced different opportunities. To achieve that, we predesigned 8 
different elimination sequences of good and bad boxes and assigned subjects randomly to 
them. Each elimination pattern of good and bad boxes was presented under different box-
number successions to different subjects. All the sequences were designed to extend over the 
maximum of nine possible decisions, reaching a standardized final round in which 
participants faced the exact same choice between a sure amount of €40 and a 50/50 change of 
getting either €100 or €0. The box removed in that last round, and consequently the payoff 
received by the participants who did not accept any of the offers, was randomly selected by 
the computer. In this respect, we simply told subjects that the boxes to be eliminated were 
randomly determined. 
As shown in Table 1, in sequences 1 and 2 (S1 and S2), the elimination of good and bad 
boxes is alternated, starting with a good box in S1 and with a bad box in S2. In S3 and S4 two 
eliminations of the same kind are alternated with two of the other, starting with good boxes in 
S3 and with bad boxes in S4. S5 and S6 consist of three eliminations of the same type 
followed by three of the other, plus two alternated boxes at the end. S5 begins with good ones 
and S6 with bad ones. In S7 and S8, four eliminations of the same kind are followed by 4 of 
the other, starting with good boxes in S7 and with bad ones in S8.  
Thus, in all the odd-numbered sequences, subjects always face offers lower or equal to 
the initial and final €40, which reach lower levels as the number of the sequence increases. In 
                                                 
2 Written instructions are available from the authors upon request. 
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the even-numbered sequences, participants always face offers higher or equal to €40, which 
get to higher levels in higher-numbered sequences.        
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
The structure of the sequences provides several absolutely transparent comparison points, 
in which subjects face exactly the same choices but having faced different opportunities. It is 
especially interesting in this respect that all the subjects who reject the previous offers and get 
to the final round reach the same decision, but following markedly different paths depending 
on the sequence. 
A total of 265 university students participated in the experiment (slightly over 30 per 
sequence). It was organized in 8 identical sessions that lasted about one hour each. 
It is interesting to note that our decision environment shares some important similarities 
with the “Deal or No Deal” TV game show. We construct, however, a fully controlled 
experimental environment that allows for transparent tests of the influence of previously 
faced opportunities on decision making. Thus, our choice environment is defined by some 
key features not present in the Deal or no Deal game. For instance, transparent and controlled 
comparison points to study the role of forgone alternatives, a predefined dynamic 
environment with a fixed rule to generate choice options, or individual and private decisions. 
 
 
2. Results 
 
To begin with, Table 2 shows a comprehensive descriptive summary of the results obtained 
in the experiment. The leftmost column contains the number of subjects facing each 
particular sequence. The rightmost column displays the number of participants remaining in 
the final round, that is, the number of individuals that rejected all the previous offers and got 
to the final decision between a sure amount of €40 and a 50/50 chance of €100 or €0. Finally, 
the third row for each sequence shows the percentage of remaining subjects accepting the 
sure offer in each specific round of the game. These data completely characterize the 
behaviour displayed by participants in the game. In other words, the original data set can be 
completely reconstructed from Table 2.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
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As the table shows, between 11% and 23% of the subjects, depending on the sequence, 
accepted the initial offer of €40 and stopped playing in the first round; between 23% and 48% 
of the participants got to the final round; and between 30% and 75% of the subjects that faced 
the final round accepted the last offer. If we assume for instance, just to illustrate, EUT and 
the widely-used utility function u(x) = (x)1-r/(1-r), with constant relative risk aversion, the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion that makes subjects indifferent in the final round between 
the sure offer of €40 and the 50/50 chance of €0 or €100 is r = 0.24. This means that, under 
those assumptions, between 30% and 75% of the subjects, with an average of 46.91%, show a 
coefficient of relative risk aversion greater than 0.24 in the last round. These figures are 
broadly consistent with previous elicitations of risk attitudes found in the literature under the 
indicated utility function (see, for example, Holt and Laury, 2002).  
Let us now focus on the main issue of how the rates of acceptance are affected by the 
opportunities faced by subjects during the game, making use of the transparent comparison 
points generated by our design. The small number of participants accepting the sure offer in 
each particular round makes it difficult to get statistically significant results by comparing 
only single sequences to each other. It is straightforward, however, to group sequences 
together in a meaningful way to get stronger and clearer results. In what follows, we will 
focus mainly on the final round, where all the sequences get to the exact same choice but 
having followed different paths. 
One clear pattern emerges out of that final stage. Namely, all the sequences in which 
subjects have only faced offers lower or equal to the initial and final €40 (the odd-numbered 
sequences) show higher percentages of acceptance, or in other words higher degrees of risk 
aversion, than the sequences in which participants have always faced offers higher or equal to 
€40 (the even-numbered sequences). In the odd-numbered sequences, the percentages of 
acceptance range from 47% to 75%, whereas in the even-numbered sequences they range 
from 30% to 43%. As Figure 2 depicts, the difference between the means of the two groups 
of sequences is 23%. 
Note also that this pattern repeats itself in all the transparent comparison points of the 
game, which include as well round 3 for sequences 1 and 2, round 5 for sequences 1 to 4 and 
round 7 for sequences 1, 2, 5 and 6. In all those points, the odd-numbered sequences display 
higher rates of acceptance than the even-numbered ones, with the only exception of sequence 
1 in round 5, which shows a percentage slightly below the highest even-numbered one. 
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[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
The statistical significance of these results is verified by a Fisher’s exact test comparing 
odd- and even-numbered sequences in the final round (p-value: 0.02). In other words, the 
sequences in which subjects have faced offers below or equal to €40 show significantly 
higher acceptance rates (or degrees of risk aversion) in the final round that the ones in which 
participants have faced offers above or equal to €40. A Fisher’s exact test comparing the 
proportions showed by odd- and even-numbered sequences in the first round (p-value: 0.41) 
confirms that the observed differences do not come from differences in the samples, but are a 
consequence of the path followed by subjects in the game. The opportunities previously faced 
are the only difference between the two groups of sequences at the transparent comparison 
point provided by the final round.  
Table 3 shows a logistic regression analysis that provides further insight into this pattern 
of results. Two separate regressions are presented. First, the probability of acceptance in the 
final round is regressed on the group of sequences (odd versus even), on the average offer 
received in each particular sequence and on the interaction term between these two variables. 
Note that the average offer received completely identifies each individual sequence. Within 
the odd-numbered sequences, offers reach lower levels (and a lower average) as the number 
of the sequence increases; within the even-numbered sequences, offers reach higher levels 
(and a higher average) as the number of the sequence increases. To make the regression 
results meaningful once the interaction term is introduced, the two main variables have been 
standardized, subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. To check for 
consistency, a second regression is presented without the interaction term in it and without 
standardizing the variables. 
The results obtained from the logistic regression analysis are clear-cut and in line with 
what has been presented so far. Namely, the probability of acceptance in the final round is 
significantly higher for the subjects that have previously faced offers below or at the initial 
and final €40 (in the odd-numbered sequences) than for the ones that have faced offers above 
or at €40 (in the even-numbered sequences). The variable representing the specific average 
size of the offers is not found to be significant, either generally (see main variable) or within 
any one of the subgroups (see interaction).3
 
        
                                                 
3 The interaction between the two main variables was also analyzed following the method suggested by Ai and 
Norton (2003) and Norton et al. (2004) for nonlinear models, confirming its non-significance. 
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[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
Overall, the results obtained confirm that previously faced options play a significant role 
in decision making under risk. In the next section, two alternative theoretical accounts for our 
findings are suggested and discussed.  
 
 
3. Theoretical Accounts 
 
Two alternative theoretical approaches to account for the role of forgone opportunities in 
decision making avail themselves. One of them comes from the reference-dependent 
approach to individual preferences, well-known in economics; the other one comes from the 
more psychological sampling approach to decision making. Let us discuss them briefly one 
by one. 
 
The reference-dependent approach.—Reference-dependent approaches to individual 
preferences have gained widespread success in economics and decision research, especially 
since the popularization of Prospect Theory (PT). In contrast with more conventional 
economic approaches, in which the possible outcomes of available choice options are valued 
in absolute terms (as, for example, in EUT), reference-dependent theories are based on the 
idea that outcomes are always evaluated relative to some relevant reference point.  
Despite their success, a crucial and largely unresolved issue for reference-dependent 
approaches is how the relevant reference points are determined. In this respect, most 
researchers have simply made the virtually untested assumption that the reference point is 
always the current asset position (or status quo) in the relevant domain. It has to be noted 
however that, although Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggested current asset position as a 
relevant aspect of reference points and based most of their analysis on it, such an assumption 
is not a constituent part of PT. Indeed, the authors explicitly state that “there are situations in 
which gains and losses are coded relative to an expectation or aspiration level that differs 
from the status quo.” (p. 286).  
Going back to our experiment, it is apparent that standard reference-dependent 
specifications in which the reference point is just equated with current asset position cannot 
accommodate the effects of previously faced opportunities found here. Asset position simply 
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does not change at all during our game. There are however a small number of recent papers in 
which reference points are explicitly made dependent on expectations. An important aspect of 
this kind of approach is that it allows for reference-point effects in contexts in which subjects 
do not experience actual gains or losses. This provides a well-suited framework to account 
for the role of forgone opportunities in decision making.  
The main models in this area are the ones proposed by Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007, 
2009). Another interesting example, more similar to the model explained here, can be found 
in Post et al. (2008).4
Let us assume that the reference-dependent value of a specific lottery Lj, designated as 
RDV(Lj), is determined by the following expression: 
 Below we present a simpler model, based on the idea that reference 
points depend on expectations determined by previously faced options, to illustrate how this 
approach can easily account for the type of effects of forgone opportunities found in our 
experiment.  
 
                                                        ,)()(
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iij xvpLRDV                                                     (1) 
 
where xi denotes a specific outcome within the lottery and pi the probability associated to it. 
v(xi) is a reference-dependent value function over outcomes, defined by 
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where RP is the reference point, λ (normally greater than 1) is a loss aversion parameter and α 
is a parameter determining the curvature of the value function. This specification is 
essentially the one normally used for cumulative PT (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), but 
without its characteristic probability weighting, which has been removed here for simplicity. 
All the explanations given in this section hold under the usual probability weighting functions. 
This specification could also be viewed as a reference-dependent EUT representation. 
                                                 
4 It should be noted that the “disappointment” theories by Bell (1985) and Loomes and Sugden (1986) were 
actually the first ones to make reference points explicitly dependent on expectations. In these models, however, 
expectations do not depend on previously faced situations, but just on the possible outcomes of the alternatives 
currently available.    
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Additionally, instead of associating the reference point with the current asset position, let 
us assume that RP is determined by the following expectation: 
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where {O1, … , On} represent the offers faced during the game, On being the current one, and 
δ is a (non-negative) parameter determining the weight of previous offers in the present 
reference point. With δ = 0, RP simply equals On, the current offer, and it is not influenced at 
all by previously faced options. With δ > 0, RP is an expectation determined jointly by the 
current offer and the average of the previous offers faced during the game. The higher the 
average of the offers previously faced, the higher is the expectation that determines the 
reference point.5
It is straightforward that under this specification all the odd-numbered sequences in our 
experiment, in which subjects face always offers below or equal to the initial and final €40, 
result in reference points below the current offer in the final period. On the contrary, all the 
even-numbered sequences, in which subjects face only offers above or equal to €40, result in 
reference points above the current offer in the final period. This establishes a clear difference 
between these two groups of sequences that leads easily to the main results obtained in the 
experiment. Namely, that the odd-numbered sequences show significantly higher acceptance 
rates than the even-numbered ones. Figure 3 illustrates this point. 
  
The three different plots in Figure 3 show how changes in the reference point affect the 
distance in terms of value (or RDV) between the two alternatives in the final choice, for three 
different sets of parameters. The alternative offering a 50/50 chance of €100 or €0 is labelled 
LR (for risky lottery); the sure offer of €40 is labelled LS (for safe lottery). The vertical axes 
                                                 
5 Other simple variants of this model could include, for example, having all the possible outcomes previously 
faced (not only the offers) affecting the expectation that determines the reference point; having the median of 
the amounts previously faced (instead of the average) influencing the reference point; using the average or the 
median of all the possible outcomes in the current choice (instead of simply the current offer) as the default 
reference point; or assigning different weights to different periods. Such modifications would allow the model 
just described to be easily applied to many other decision environments. All the main results discussed here hold 
for all these variants of the model.  
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represent RDV(LR) – RDV(LS). The first plot depicts the case of risk aversion (α < 1) and no 
loss aversion (λ = 1). The second plot shows the case of both risk aversion (α < 1) and loss 
aversion (λ > 1). Finally, the third plot illustrates the case no risk aversion (α = 1) and loss 
aversion (λ > 1). The specific degrees of risk aversion and loss aversion chosen, α = 0.8 and λ 
= 2, are very similar to the ones usually found in implementations of cumulative PT. Any 
other reasonable parameters result in essentially the same patterns.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
 
The initial plot demonstrates that, under risk aversion, movements of the reference point 
downwards from the sure offer of 40, as the ones found in the odd-numbered sequences, 
result in a reduced RDV(LR) – RDV(LS) and consequently in higher percentages of acceptance 
of the sure offer (LS). This is represented by the lower convex segment of the graph. On the 
contrary, movements of the reference point upwards from 40, as the ones found in the even-
numbered sequences, produce a larger RDV(LR) – RDV(LS) and therefore lower rates of 
acceptance. This corresponds to the higher concave segment of the graph. Overall, this is 
exactly the pattern found in our experiment. 
The second plot illustrates that, under both risk aversion and loss aversion, the behaviour 
of RDV(LR) – RDV(LS) for movements of RP upwards from 40 is essentially the same as in 
the first plot, but the result of movements below 40 tends to reverse. Note however that that 
reversion results in a much weaker pattern than the one found above 40. Consequently, again 
under this specification, which is very much in line with the ones usually employed for 
cumulative PT, odd-numbered sequences are predicted to show significantly higher 
percentages of acceptance than even-numbered ones. 
Finally, the third plot depicts the case of loss aversion without risk aversion, which is 
quite uncommon in the literature. Under such a specification, movements of the reference 
point away from the current offer (40 in the final round), in any direction, result in a larger 
RDV(LR) – RDV(LS) and consequently in lower rates of acceptance.6
                                                 
6 Note however that, even in this case, assuming a lower δ for movements below the current offer than for 
movements above it would result in the pattern found in our experiment. Such an assumption seems justified by 
the idea that people adapt easier to good outcomes than to bad ones. 
 This pattern together 
with the one shown in the first plot determines the shape of the plot in the middle.  
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On the whole, Figure 3 clearly demonstrates that the kind of reference-dependent model 
proposed, in which the reference point depends on expectations influenced by previously 
faced options, can effectively account for the type of effects of forgone opportunities 
identified in the present paper.  
 
Decision by sampling.—Decision by Sampling (DbS, Stewart et al., 2006) is a general 
theory of decision making based on the idea that individuals make choices by sequentially 
comparing the attributes of available choice options to samples of similar attributes found in 
the current choice environment or in memory. Favourable comparisons increase the value 
assigned to an alternative and the alternative with the highest value is chosen. In such a 
process, the attributes of a particular choice option contribute to its value according to the 
relative rank they occupy within the comparison attributes found in the relevant sample. 
Specifically, a higher relative rank means a higher rate of favourable comparisons and 
consequently a higher value. This approach provides a remarkably useful framework to 
account for a wide variety of context effects in decision making (see Stewart, 2009). A closed 
mathematical formulation of DbS is presented in Stewart and Simpson (2008) and Stewart 
(2009). The details of it are beyond the scope of the present paper. 
  DbS provides a parsimonious and effective explanation for our findings. Under the 
single straightforward assumption that the offers faced in previous rounds remain in subjects’ 
memories during the game, it is apparent that, in the odd-numbered sequences, the relative 
rank of the final offer of €40 within the sample of comparison attributes is considerably 
increased by the offers below €40 previously faced. On the contrary, in the even-numbered 
sequences, the relative rank of that offer is notably decreased by the offers above €40 faced 
before. Consequently, the final offer will be assigned a significantly higher value in all the 
odd-numbered sequences than in any of the even-numbered ones. As a result, the percentages 
of acceptance in the odd-numbered sequences are expected to be significantly higher. This is 
exactly the pattern identified in our experiment.   
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
We have shown that previously faced opportunities play a significant role in economic 
decision making under risk, affecting in predictable ways the evaluation of subsequent choice 
13 
 
options. Specifically, having faced worse (better) opportunities in the past produces 
significantly higher (lower) degrees of risk aversion in later decisions. These patterns are 
fundamentally at odds with most existing decision models (for instance, Expected Utility 
Theory, standard versions of Prospect Theory, Rank-Dependent Utility Theory, Regret 
Theory, the TAX model, Decision Field Theory or static choice heuristics) and, consequently, 
have wide-ranging implications for economic theory. Our results demonstrate that economic 
decision making should be understood and modelled in a dynamic framework in which the 
opportunities available to decision makers determine how subsequent choice options are 
evaluated. These findings also have important potential applications. Generally, they suggest 
that making certain opportunities available to decision makers will influence the way they 
evaluate subsequent choice options they encounter in predictable ways. They also provide 
guidance on how alternatives will be evaluated depending on the opportunities faced before. 
All these issues certainly merit further investigation in future research.    
We have suggested two alternative parsimonious theoretical approaches to the role of 
previously faced opportunities in decision making. One of them involves constructing 
reference-dependent models in which reference points are determined by expectations 
influenced by previously faced options. The other one implies a stronger departure from 
conventional economic approaches and involves adopting a theoretical framework in which 
the value assigned to choice options depends on the relative rank of their attributes within 
relevant comparison samples taken from the current choice environment and from memory.  
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Tables and figures 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Structure of the 8 Sequences*,† 
 
 Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
S1 Offer 40 35.56 40 34.29 40 32 40 26.67 40 
 Box removed G B G B G B G B Random 
S2 Offer 40 44.45 40 45.72 40 48 40 53.34 40 
 Box removed B G B G B G B G Random 
S3 Offer 40 35.56 30 34.29 40 32 20 26.67 40 
 Box removed G G B B G G B B Random 
S4 Offer 40 44.45 50 45.72 40 48 60 53.34 40 
 Box removed B B G G B B G G Random 
S5 Offer 40 35.56 30 22.86 26.67 32 40 26.67 40 
 Box removed G G G B B B G B Random 
S6 Offer 40 44.45 50 57.15 53.34 48 40 53.34 40 
 Box removed B B B G G G B G Random 
S7 Offer 40 35.56 30 22.86 13.34 16 20 26.67 40 
 Box removed G G G G B B B B Random 
S8 Offer 40 44.45 50 57.15 66.67 64 60 53.34 40 
 Box removed B B B B G G G G Random 
  *G = Good box (€100); B = Bad box (€0). 
  †Red colour designates offers under €40; blue colour offers above €40.  
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Table 2 
Descriptive Summary of Results  
 
 Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 n last round 
S1 Offer 40 35.56 40 34.29 40 32 40 26.67 40  
n = 36 Box rem. G B G B G B G B Random 16 
 % accept. 11.11 3.13 9.68 7.14 7.69 8.33 22.73 5.88 75  
S2 Offer 40 44.45 40 45.72 40 48 40 53.34 40  
n = 35 Box rem. B G B G B G B G Random 13 
 % accept. 22.86 14.81 0 8.7 0 14.29 5.56 23.53 30.77  
S3 Offer 40 35.56 30 34.29 40 32 20 26.67 40  
n = 35 Box rem. G G B B G G B B Random 13 
 % accept. 11.43 3.23 13.33 3.85 24 0 21.05 13.33 61.54  
S4 Offer 40 44.45 50 45.72 40 48 60 53.34 40  
n = 34 Box rem. B B G G B B G G Random 13 
 % accept. 17.65 0 17.86 0 8.7 19.05 23.53 0 38.46  
S5 Offer 40 35.56 30 22.86 26.67 32 40 26.67 40  
n = 32 Box rem. G G G B B B G B Random 8 
 % accept. 15.63 3.7 3.85 16 4.76 20 25 33.33 50  
S6 Offer 40 44.45 50 57.15 53.34 48 40 53.34 40  
n = 32 Box rem. B B B G G G B G Random 10 
 % accept. 15.63 3.7 11.54 13.04 10 0 16.67 33.33 30  
S7 Offer 40 35.56 30 22.86 13.34 16 20 26.67 40  
n = 31 Box rem. G G G G B B B B Random 15 
 % accept. 22.58 0 4.17 0 4.35 0 13.64 21.05 46.67  
S8 Offer 40 44.45 50 57.15 66.67 64 60 53.34 40  
n = 30 Box rem. B B B B G G G G Random 7 
 % accept. 20 4.17 30.43 12.5 14.29 33.33 0 12.5 42.86  
    
 
 
 
Table 3 
Logistic Regression Results for Probability of Acceptance, Final Round 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*The variable “ao” has been standardized in this specification, subtracting the 
mean and dividing by the standard deviation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Specification Estimate Std. error z value p value 
odd-even (oe) -2.271 1.092 -2.080 0.038 
average offer (ao)* 0.994 0.640 1.552 0.121 
oe*ao -0.568 1.052 -0.539 0.590 
intercept 1.220 0.617 1.980 0.048 
Specification Estimate Std. error z value p value 
odd-even (oe) -2.459 1.036 -2.373 0.0177 
average offer (ao) 0.098 0.063 1.556 0.1198 
intercept -2.766 2.043 -1.354 0.1757 
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Fig. 1. Screenshot from the Game 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Average Percentages of Acceptance in the Final Round in Odd- and Even-Numbered 
Sequences  
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Fig. 3. Effects of Changes in the Reference Point (RP) on RDV(LR) – RDV(LS) 
 
λ = 1, α = 0.8 
λ = 2, α = 0.8 
λ = 2, α = 1 
